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In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez’s distinction between denotation, 
epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then 
outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according 
to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the 
user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which 
would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative 
inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the 
interpretational conception I defend here and Suárez’s inferential 
conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—
interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is that in virtue 
of what something is an epistemic representation of a something else. 
 
1. The Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation 
Most philosophers of science today agree that models play a central role in science and 
that one of their main functions is to represent aspects of the world (cf. Hughes 1997; 
French and Ladyman 1997; Giere 1999; Teller 2001; Suárez 2002; French 2003; Bailer-
Jones 2003). R.I.G. Hughes, for one, claims ‘The characteristic—perhaps the only 
characteristic—that all theoretical models have in common is that they provide 
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representations of parts of the world […]’ (Hughes 1997, S325). The Rutherford model 
of the atom, for example, represents the atom and the ideal pendulum model can be used 
to represent the tire swing hanging from a tree in the garden. However, there is still 
much disagreement as to what we mean when we say that a model represents a system. 
In this paper, I follow Mauricio Suárez in distinguishing different notions of 
representation. In particular, Suárez distinguishes between representation and ‘accurate, 
true and complete representation’ (Suárez 2004, 767). According to Suárez, the primary 
aim of a substantial account of scientific representation—i.e. an account which specifies 
necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific representation—is to answer the 
question: ‘In virtue of what does a certain model represent a certain system?’ and not the 
question: ‘In virtue of what does a certain model represent a certain system accurately or 
truthfully?’ (Suárez 2004, 767–768). 
According to the inferential conception of scientific representation that Suárez 
proposes, ‘A represents B only if (i) the representational force of A points to B and (ii) A 
allows competent and informed agents to draw inferences regarding B’ (Suárez 2004, 
773). According to Suárez’s account, there are two conditions that a model has to satisfy 
in order to represent the system: the first condition, which I shall call denotation, is that 
the model is used by someone to represent the system; the second, which I shall call 
surrogative reasoning, is that the model allows its user(s) to perform specific inferences 
from the model to the system. 
According to the inferential conception, however, denotation and surrogative 
reasoning, though necessary, are not jointly sufficient conditions for a model to represent 
a system. Therefore, the inferential conception is not a substantial account of 
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representation. Suárez claims that ‘representation is not the kind of notion that requires, 
or admits, [universal necessary and sufficient] conditions’ (Suárez 2004, 771). Thus, 
according to Suárez, an account of scientific representation cannot (and should not) 
provide us with a set of jointly sufficient conditions for scientific representation. As 
Suárez seems to acknowledge though, his reasons for claiming this are ambiguous (cf. 
Suárez 2004, n.4).  
On the one hand, Suárez claims that one should not expect further conditions because 
there are ‘[…] no deeper features to scientific representation other than its surface 
features [(i.e. denotation and surrogative reasoning)]’ (Suárez 2004, 769). It is in this 
vein, I suspect, that Suárez claims that the inferential conception is a deflationary 
conception of scientific representation (Suárez 2004, 770–771). 
On the other hand, Suárez thinks that additional conditions may need to hold in 
order for a model to represent a system, but that these additional conditions are different 
in different instances scientific representation. For example, Suárez claims that: ‘In every 
specific context of inquiry, given a putative target and source, some stronger condition 
will typically be met; but which one specifically will vary from case to case. In some cases 
it will be isomorphism, in other cases it will be similarity, etc.’ (Suárez 2004, 776).1 
According to this interpretation, Suárez would be claiming that no general account of 
representation can specify necessary and sufficient conditions because, beside denotation 
and surrogative reasoning, there are no other general conditions that are sufficient for 
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scientific representation. If this interpretation is correct, Suárez’s inferential conception is 
a minimalist conception of representation rather than deflationary one.2  
Suárez ‘[…] propose[s] that we adopt from the start a deflationary or minimalist 
attitude […] towards the concept of scientific representation’ (Suárez 2004, 770). 
However, it is not clear why we should adopt a deflationary attitude from the start. The 
claim that representation does not admit universal necessary and sufficient condition 
seems only indirectly supported by Suárez’s arguments from the lack of success of two 
specific versions of the similarity and structural conceptions of representation, [iso] and 
[sim], to the correctness of a deflationary approach (cf. Suárez 2002 and 2003). However, 
these arguments are far from establishing that no adequate substantial account of 
scientific representation is viable. 
First, insofar as [iso] and [sim] can be interpreted as either accounts of scientific 
representation or accounts of faithful scientific representation, they would seem to be 
accounts of faithful scientific representation. Even if they actually failed to provide us 
with an adequate substantial account of faithful scientific representation, this would 
hardly prove that it is not possible to formulate an adequate, substantial account of 
scientific representation simpliciter. Second, even if [iso] and [sim] were actually accounts 
of scientific representation simpliciter, these two accounts are far from being the only two 
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possible substantial accounts of scientific representation.3 Indeed, they are a far cry from 
exhausting the set of all the possibilities. 
In this paper, I will substantiate this claim by proposing and defending an account of 
scientific models as epistemic representations of systems in the world, which, I argue, is 
both adequate and substantial—i.e. one that answers the question ‘In virtue of what does 
a certain model represent a certain system?’. If I am right, this undermines Suárez’s 
reasons for settling for an non-substantial account of scientific representation, for I take it 
that, if it is possible to provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific 
representation, we should do so and not settle for an account that only provides a set 
individually necessary but not jointly sufficient conditions.  
The importance of Suárez’s work on scientific representation can be scarcely 
overestimated. In particular, Suárez has to be praised for making explicit the close 
connection between scientific representation and surrogative reasoning and for insisting 
on the importance of distinguishing between what I will call epistemic representation and 
faithful epistemic representation. However, Suárez’s pessimism about finding deeper 
features of scientific representation leaves one with the mistaken impression that there is 
something mysterious about our ability to use models to perform pieces of surrogative 
reasoning about their target systems.4 If the account I develop and defend here is correct 
in its main lines, the user’s ability to perform surrogative inferences from the model to 
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the system can be explained by the fact that the user interprets the model in terms of the 
system. Interpretation is what grounds both scientific representation and surrogative 
reasoning. 
2. Surrogative Reasoning: Validity and Soundness 
‘Surrogative reasoning’ is the expression introduced by Chris Swoyer (1991) to designate 
those cases in which someone uses one object, the vehicle of representation, to learn about 
some other object, the target of representation. A good example of a piece of surrogative 
reasoning is the case in which someone uses a map of the London Underground to find 
out how to get from one station on the London Underground network to another. The 
map and the network are clearly two distinct objects. One is a piece of glossy paper on 
which coloured lines and names are printed; the other is an intricate system of, among 
other things, trains, tunnels, rails and platforms. By examining the map, however, one 
can learn a great deal about the network. For example, one can find which trains they can 
catch in order to reach one of the stations on the network from any other station on the 
network. We can thus say that the map allows its users to carry out a piece of surrogative 
reasoning about the network or, less awkwardly, that the users of the map can perform 
surrogative inferences from the map to the network. 
Here, it is useful to sketch the distinction between valid and sound surrogative 
inferences (even if the resources needed to define the notion of valid surrogative inference 
will only become available later). A surrogative inference is sound if it is valid and its 
conclusion is true of the target. However, a surrogative inference can be valid even if it is 
not sound (i.e. an inference is valid irrespectively of the truth of its conclusion).  
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3. Denotation, Epistemic Representation and Faithful Epistemic Representation 
One of the main problems with the notion of representation is that by ‘representation’ 
people often mean different things. For the present purposes, it is important to 
distinguish three senses of ‘representation’. In a first sense, both the logo of London 
Underground and a map of London Underground represent the London Underground 
network. In the terminology I adopt here, we can say that they both denote the network. 
Denotation may well be a matter of convention. Here, I will assume that, in principle, 
anything can denote anything else if a group of users implicitly or explicitly agrees that it 
does so. 
However, the map of London Underground does more than just denoting the 
London Underground network; it represents the London Underground in a second, 
stronger sense: it is an epistemic representation of the network. It is in virtue of the fact 
that the map of London Underground represents London Underground in this stronger 
sense that a user can perform (valid though not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences 
from the map to the network. The same does not apply to the London Underground 
logo. If one has to figure out how to go from Holborn to Finsbury Park by tube, they can 
use a map, but there is no obvious way to use logo. An examination of the logo does not 
allow us to infer much about the London Underground network. In the terminology I 
shall use here, the map is an epistemic representation the network or while the logo does 
not.5 
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On the conception of epistemic representation that I will defend here, the fact that 
some user performs a surrogative inference from a certain object, the vehicle, to another, 
the target, is merely a “symptom” of the fact that, for that user, that vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of that target, a symptom that allows us to distinguish cases of 
epistemic representation (such as the London Underground map) from cases of mere 
denotation (such as the London Underground logo). However, there may be 
“asymptomatic” cases of epistemic representation. That is, a user does not necessarily 
need to perform any actual piece of surrogative reasoning or other in order for the vehicle 
to be an epistemic representation of the target. For example, even if someone has never 
performed and will never perform any actual inference from the London Underground 
map to the London Underground network, the map may still be an epistemic 
representation of the network for her provided that she would have been able to perform 
one of those inferences if only the occasion had arisen. 
We can now formulate the following characterization of the notion of epistemic 
representation. A vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user 
if and only if the user is able to perform valid (though not necessarily sound) surrogative 
inferences from the vehicle to the target. I will call this necessary and sufficient condition 
for epistemic representation valid surrogative reasoning. This definition thus says that 
valid surrogative reasoning is a necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic 
representation. 
Two remarks are in order here. First, according to the characterization of epistemic 
representation above, a vehicle is not an epistemic representation of a certain target in 
and of itself—it is an epistemic representation for someone. Epistemic representation is 
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not a dyadic relation between a vehicle and a target but a triadic relation between a 
vehicle, a target and a (set of) user(s).6 For the sake of simplicity, I will often omit to 
mention the users of an epistemic representation unless it is required by the context. 
However, this does not mean that a vehicle can be an epistemic representation of a target 
for no one in particular or in its own right—a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a 
certain target only if there are some users for whom it is an epistemic representation of 
that target.7 
Second, the notion of epistemic representation is primarily technical notion. As many 
technical notions, however, the notion of epistemic representation is meant to capture 
what I take to be one of the senses of the ordinary notion of representation. According to 
this definition, numerous prototypical cases of what we would ordinarily consider 
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representations turn out to be epistemic representations for us. Portraits, photographs, 
maps, graphs, and a large number of other representational devices usually allow their 
users to perform (valid) inferences to their targets and, as such, according to definition 0, 
they would be considered epistemic representations of their targets (for us). For example, 
according to 0, if we are able to perform (valid) inferences from a portrait to its subject 
(as we usually seem able to do), then the portrait is an epistemic representation of its 
subject (for us). 
However, there is also a sense in which the notion of epistemic representation seems 
to be broader than the ordinary notion of representation. This, I think, is due to an 
ambiguity of the ordinary notion of representation. ‘Represent’ is sometimes used as a 
success verb and sometimes not. This is probably why we usually tend to conflate two 
distinct facts—the fact that a certain vehicle is an (epistemic) representation of a certain 
target and the fact that it can be more or less faithful (epistemic) representation of that 
target. 
Consider, for example, an old 1930s map of London Underground and a new map of 
London Underground. Both represent the London Underground network in the sense 
that one can perform valid surrogative inference from either map to the network and 
both represent the same aspects of the network. But they offer conflicting representations 
of some of these aspects. For example, from the old map, one would infer that there is no 
direct train connection between Euston and Oxford Circus, while, from the new map, 
one would infer that Victoria Line trains operate between these two stations. 
Whereas all the valid inferences from the new map to the network are sound, some of 
the inferences from the old map to the network that are valid according to its standard 
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interpretation will no longer be sound today because, in the meantime, the network has 
significantly changed. In this sense, only the new map of London Underground faithfully 
represents today’s network, while the old map’s representation of it is only partially 
faithful, as it misrepresents some aspects of the network. (Obviously, the reverse is true of 
the London Underground network of the 1930s, which is faithfully represented by the 
old map but not by the new map.) In general, a vehicle is a compeltely faithful 
representation of a target if and only if the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the 
target and all of the valid inferences from the vehicle to the target are sound. It is a 
partially faithful representation of a target if and only if the vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of the target and some of the valid inferences from the vehicle to the target 
are sound. It is a completely unfaithful epistemic representation of a target if and only if the 
vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target and none of the valid inferences from 
the vehicle to the target are sound. A vehicle misrepresents (some aspects of) a target if the 
vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target and some of the valid inferences from 
the vehicle to the target are not sound.8 The distinction between epistemic representation 
and faithful epistemic representation is analogous to Suárez’s distinction between 
scientific representation and “accurate, true, or complete” representation. 
Unlike epistemic representation, faithful epistemic representation is a matter of 
degree. A representation can be more or less faithful to its target. The same vehicle can be 
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a faithful representation of some aspects of the target and misrepresent other aspects. This 
seems to be the case with the old London Underground map. The map misrepresents 
today’s system in the sense that, from it, it is possible to draw many false conclusions 
about it. However, from it, it is also possible to draw many true conclusions about 
aspects of today’s network. Unlike the occasional tourist, a knowledgeable user may be 
able to use the old map successfully for many purposes even if the map, to a large extent, 
misrepresents the system. The knowledgeable user for example knows that, if, on the old 
map, two stations are not connected by any line, she should not conclude that in today’s 
network, there is no direct train service between the two stations for some of the subway 
lines which operate in today’s network did not exist in the 1930s. 
The notion of completely faithful representation seems to coincide with what Suárez 
calls a true representation. It is important to note the probably obvious fact that, in order 
to be a completely faithful representation of its target, a representation does not need to 
be a perfect replica of its target. The new London Underground map is an example of a 
completely faithful representation (or, at least, I assume it is), but it is not a perfect 
replica of the London Underground network. There are innumerably many aspects of the 
London Underground network are beyond the representational scope of the map (such as 
the internal structure of station, the spatial relations among them and so on).9 
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representation. Indeed, I doubt that any representation is complete in Suárez sense. According to Suárez, 
‘[A representation] is complete if it is true and fully informative, licensing inferences to all truths about the 
target’ (Suárez 2004, 776). As far as I can see, every real representation falls far short of being a complete in 
Suarez’s sense. All actual representations represent only some aspect or other of their targets. Even the map 
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I suspect that the fact that ‘representation’ is used to refer to what I call denotation, 
epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation is the source of many of 
the problems associated with the notion of ‘representation’. Ordinary language does not 
distinguish between these different senses of representation and their conflation seems to 
be the source of many misunderstandings among philosophers who are interested in 
representation. I think that many misunderstandings could be easily avoided by carefully 
distinguishing between different senses of representation as Suárez proposes we do. 
4. Scientific Models as Epistemic Representations 
How do the notions I have introduced so far relate to the problem of how scientific 
models represent? Scientific models, I claim, are epistemic representations of aspects of 
certain system in the world. A certain model represents a certain target primarily in the 
sense that a user can use the model to perform surrogative inferences from the model to 
the system. 
The Rutherford model of the atom, for example, was proposed by Ernst Rutherford 
(1911) in order to account for the phenomenon now known as Rutherford scattering. In 
a series of experiments in 1909, Hans Geiger, one of Rutherford’s collaborators, and 
Ernest Marsden, one of Geiger’s students, found that, in passing through a foil of gold 
0.00004 cm thick, one in 20,000 alpha-particles was scattered at an average angle of 90° 
(Geiger and Marsden 1909). The phenomenon could not be accounted for by what, at 
the time, was the main model of the atom: the Thomson model of the atom, also 
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informally known as the plum pudding model. In the plum pudding model, the 
negatively charged electrons are embedded in a sphere of uniform positive charge that 
takes up the whole volume of the atom, like raisins in a plum pudding. The positive 
charge and mass are uniformly distributed over the volume of the atom. If the golden foil 
in Geiger and Marsden’s experiment was made up of atoms like the ones in the Thomson 
model, even if all of the approximately 400 atoms in the foil fortuitously happened to 
deflect an alpha-particle in the same direction, the particle would still be scattered at a 
very small angle. From the Thomson model of the atom or, more precisely, from a model 
of Geiger and Marsden’s experiment in which the atoms in the golden foil are 
represented as in the Thomson model of the atom, we can therefore infer that Rutherford 
scattering would never occur. However, since Geiger and Masden’s 1909 experiments 
show that the phenomenon actually occurs, the Thomson model misrepresents (that 
aspect of) the atom, for it leads to a false conclusion about it. 
In the Rutherford model, on the other hand, all the positive charge of the atom and 
almost all of its mass is concentrated in the nucleus, whose radius is one-hundredth of 
that of the atom, and the rest of the volume of the atom is empty except for the orbiting 
electrons. Since the total deflection of a positively charged particle by a sphere of positive 
charge increases as the inverse of the radius of the sphere, the encounter with one single 
nucleus can deflect an alpha-particle at an angle of 90°. However, since most of the 
volume of the atom is empty except for the electrons and the mass of electrons is too little 
to scatter high-momentum alpha-particles, most alpha-particles will not be deflected at 
large angles. Unlike from the Thomson model of the atom, thus, we can soundly infer 
that Rutherford scattering will occur from the Rutherford model. 
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When we say that the Thomson and Rutherford models of the atom represent the 
gold atom, we are not merely saying that they denote the gold atom, like ‘Au’ on the 
periodic table does. Rather, we are saying that they are epistemic representations of the 
atom—in the sense that both can be used by their users to perform inferences about 
certain aspects of the atom. 
5. Epistemic Representation and Analytic Interpretations 
I will now put forward and develop a substantial conception of epistemic representation, 
which I call the interpretational conception of epistemic representation. According to the 
interpretational conception, a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target 
(for a certain user) if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms 
of the target. I will call this necessary and sufficient condition interpretation. But what is 
an interpretation? 
According to a general, though somewhat loose, characterisation of the notion of 
interpretation, a user interprets a vehicle in terms of a target if she takes facts about the 
vehicle to stand for (putative) facts about the target. One specific way to interpret the 
vehicle in terms of the target (though possibly not the only way) is to adopt what I will 
call an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. An analytic 
interpretation of a vehicle in terms of the target identifies a (non-empty) set of relevant 
objects in the vehicle (ΩV={oV1,… oVn}) and a (non-empty) set of relevant objects in the 
target (ΩT={oT1,… oTn}), a (possibly empty) set of relevant properties of and relations 
among objects in the vehicle (ΡV={nRV1,…, nRVm}, where nR denotes an n-ary relation and 
properties are construed as 1-ary relations) and a set of relevant properties and relations 
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among objects in the target (ΡT={nRT1,…, nRTm}), and a set of relevant functions from 
(ΩV)n—i.e. the Cartesian product of ΩV by itself n times—to ΩV (ΦV={nFV1,…, nFVm}, 
where nF denotes an n-ary function) and a set of relevant functions from (ΩT)n to ΩT 
(ΦT={nFT1,…, nFTm}). 
A user adopts an analytic interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target if and only if: 
1. The user takes the vehicle to denote the target, 
2. The user takes every object in ΩV to denote one and only one 
object in ΩT and every object in ΩT to be denoted by one and 
only one object in ΩV, 
3. The user takes every n-ary relation in ΡV to denote one and 
only one relevant n-ary in ΡT and every n-ary relation in ΡT to 
be denoted by one and only one n-ary relation in ΡV, 
4. They take every n-ary function in ΦV to denote one and only 
one n-ary function in ΦT and every n-ary function in ΦT to be 
denoted by one and only one n-ary function in ΦV. 
Most interpretations of vehicles in terms of targets that we ordinarily adopt seem to be 
analytic. The standard interpretation of the London Underground map in terms of the 
London Underground network, for example, is an analytic interpretation. First, we take 
the map to denote the London Underground network—that we take the map to be a 
map of the London Underground network and not, say, the New York subway network. 
Second, we take small black circles and small coloured tabs with a name printed on the 
side to denote stations on the network with that name. Third, we take some of the 
properties of and relations among circles and tabs on the map to stand for properties of 
and relations among stations on the network. For example, we take the relation being 
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connected by a light blue line on the map to stand for the relation being connected by 
Victoria Line trains on the network. 
For the sake of simplicity, here, I will focus exclusively on analytic interpretations. So, 
when saying that a user adopts an interpretation of the target, I will always assume that 
the interpretation in question is an analytic one. However I do not mean to imply that all 
interpretations of vehicles in terms of the target are necessarily analytic. Epistemic 
representations whose standard interpretations are not analytic are at least conceivable. 
However, in practice, epistemic representations whose standard interpretations are non-
analytic seem to be the exception rather than the rule. In the overwhelming majority of 
prototypical cases of epistemic representation (which include maps, diagrams, drawings, 
photographs and, of course, models), it seems possible to reconstruct the standard 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target as an analytic one.10 If this is true, 
then, by restricting our attention to analytic interpretations, will extremely simplify the 
discussion without any comparable loss of generality. 
6. Interpretation and Surrogative Reasoning 
According to the interpretive conception of representation I defend here, users adopt an 
interpretation of the Rutherford model in terms of an atom if and only if: (1) they take 
the model as a whole to stand for the atom in question (i.e. they take the model to be a 
model of the atom), (2) they take some of the components of the model to stand for some 
of the components of the system (e.g. they take the nucleus of the atom in the model to 
                                                
10 I talk of reconstruction because, as I will mention later, user are often unable to spell out how they 
interpret the vehicle in terms of the target and sometimes are not even aware that they do interpret the 
vehicle in terms of the target. 
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stand for the nucleus of the atom in the system, the electron of the atom in the model to 
stand for one of the electrons in the system), and (3) they take some of the properties of 
and relations among the objects in the model to stand for the properties of and relations 
among the corresponding objects in the system (if those objects stand for anything in the 
atom). So, the fact that the nucleus in the model is positively charged stands for the fact 
that the object denoted by the nucleus, the nucleus of the atom in the system, is 
positively charged.  
A few remarks are in order here. First, a user does not need to believe that every object 
in the model denotes some object in the system in order to interpret the model in terms 
of the system. For example, in the Aristotelian model of the cosmos, the universe is 
represented as a system of concentric crystal spheres. The Earth lies at the centre of the 
sublunary region, which is the innermost sphere. Outside the sublunary region are the 
heavens: eight tightly fit spherical shells. The outermost spherical shell, the sphere of the 
fixed stars, hosts the stars. Each of the other spherical shell hosts one of the seven 
“planets,” which, in this model, include the Moon and the Sun. Each spherical shell 
rotates around its centre with uniform velocity. If we were to use the model today, say, to 
predict the apparent position of a star in two hours time, then according to the account I 
am outlining, we would need to interpret the model in terms of the universe. That is, the 
model would denote the universe as a whole and some of its components would denote 
some of the components of the universe. For example, the star whose position we are 
interested in would be denoted by one of the stars cast in the sphere of fixed stars. 
However, in order to interpret the model in terms of the universe, we do not need to 
assume that the sphere of fixed stars itself or any of the other crystal spheres in the model 
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denotes anything in the universe. So, a user does not need to believe that every object in 
the model stands for an object in the system. 
Second, in order to adopt a certain interpretation of a model in terms of a system, a 
user does not even need to believe that the objects in the system actually have all of the 
properties instantiated by the objects that stand for them in the model. For example, one 
does not need to believe that the string from which a certain pendulum hangs is massless 
in order to adopt an interpretation of the ideal pendulum according to which the string is 
massless. The knowledgeable user knows perfectly well that, since no real string is 
massless, the inference, though valid, is not sound and therefore will not actually draw 
that conclusion about the system from the model. The situation here is analogous to the 
one we have considered above, in which the knowledgeable user of the map is able to use 
the old London Underground map successfully in spite of the fact that the map 
misrepresents some aspects of the London Underground network. Since models often 
misrepresent some aspect of the system or other, it is usually up to the user’s competence, 
judgement and background knowledge to use the model successfully in spite of the fact 
that the model misrepresents certain aspects of the system. 
As I have already mentioned, a vehicle can both represent a system and misrepresent 
some aspects of it. Unlike epistemic representation, faithful epistemic representation is a 
matter of degree. A vehicle does not need to be a completely faithful representation of its 
target in order to be an epistemic representation of it. In fact, models usually 
misrepresent aspects of the systems they represent and it is often up to the user’s 
knowledge and competence to use the models successfully. The user’s background 
knowledge will allow her to assess which properties of objects of the model are 
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idealizations or approximations and would lead to unsound inferences about the 
properties of the corresponding objects in the system. Her competence in using the model 
in representing the system will allow her to judge which valid inferences from the model 
to the system will be unsound on the basis of her knowledge of how faithfully a certain 
model represents the various aspects of systems of that kind. 
So, if a user does not actually conclude from the ideal pendulum that the string of the 
actual pendulum is massless, it is not necessarily because their interpretation of the model 
is more restrictive than the one adopted by someone who does. Rather, it is because they 
know that inference to be unsound on the basis of their background knowledge and 
therefore they know that the aspect of the model in question misrepresents the 
corresponding aspect of the system. This obviously does not mean that the model cannot 
be an epistemic representation of that system, nor does it mean that it cannot be a 
faithful epistemic representation of other aspects of the same system. If the latter was the 
case, the widespread use of idealizations in modelling would be unexplainable. 
Similar considerations apply to the model as a whole. The Rutherford model of the 
atom represents the atom as a small classical planetary system and the Aristotelian model 
of the cosmos represents the universe as made up of eight concentric crystal spheres, but 
the user of these model does not need to believe that the atom is a small classical 
planetary system or that the universe is a system of concentric crystal spheres in order to 
use those models to represent their respective targets. 
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7. Interpretation and Surrogative Reasoning 
I will now argue that the interpretational conception of epistemic representation allows 
us to explain why, if a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target, users are 
able to perform valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target and allows us to 
tell which inferences from a vehicle to a target are valid. I take it that the fact that the 
interpretational conception of epistemic representation can explain how users are able to 
draw valid inferences from a vehicle to a target and what makes some inferences valid and 
others not are two of the greatest advantages of the interpretational conception. On the 
inferential conception, the user’s ability to perform inferences from a vehicle to a target 
seems to be a brute fact, which has no deeper explanation. This makes the connection 
between epistemic representation and valid surrogative reasoning needlessly obscure and 
the performance of valid surrogative inferences an activity as mysterious and 
unfathomable as soothsaying or divination. On the interpretational conception, on the 
other hand, the user’s ability to perform pieces of surrogative reasoning not only is not a 
mysterious skill but it is an activity that is deeply connected to the fact that vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of the target for that user. 
According to the interpretational conception of epistemic representation, a certain 
vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user) if and only if 
the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. An analytic 
interpretation underlies the following set of inference rules: 
(Rule 1) If oVi denotes oTi according to the interpretation adopted by the user, it is valid 
for the user to infer that oTi is in the target if and only if oVi is in the vehicle, 
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(Rule 2) If oV1 denotes oT1, …, oVn denotes oVn, and nRVk denotes nRkT according to the 
interpretation adopted by the user, it is valid for the user to infer that the 
relation nRkT holds among oT1, …, oTn if and only if nRVk holds among oV1, …, 
oVn, 
(Rule 3) If, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, oVi denotes oTi, oV1 
denotes oT1, …, oVn denotes oVn, and nFVk denotes nFTk, it is valid for the user 
to infer that the value of the function nFTk for the arguments oT1, …, oTn is oTi 
if and only if the value of the function nFVk is oVi for the arguments oV1, …, 
oVn. 
To illustrate how these rules apply in a concrete situation suppose that a user adopts 
the standard interpretation of the London Underground map in terms of the network 
and that she takes the map to stand for the network. According to (Rule 1), from the fact 
that there is a circle labelled ‘Holborn’ on the map, it is valid for her to infer that there is 
a station called Holborn on the London Underground network and, from the fact that 
there is no circle or tab labelled ‘Louvre Rivoli’ on the London Underground map, it is 
valid for her infer that there is no station called Louvre Rivoli on the London 
Underground network. According to (Rule 2), from the fact that the circle labelled 
‘Holborn’ is connected to the tab labelled ‘Bethnal Green’ by a coloured line, one can 
infer that a direct train service operates between Holborn and Bethnal Green station and 
from the fact that the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ is not connected to the tab labelled 
‘Highbury & Islington’ by any coloured line, one can infer that no direct train service 
operates between Holborn and Highbury & Islington stations 
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We are now finally in a position to give a definition of validity for epistemic 
representation whose interpretations are analytic. If a user adopts an analytic 
interpretation of the vehicle, then an inference from the vehicle to the target is valid (for 
that user according to that interpretation) if and only if it is in accordance with (Rule 1), 
(Rule 2), or (Rule 3) 
So, if a user is able to perform inferences from a vehicle to a target when the former is 
an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of the latter, it is because (a) a vehicle 
is an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of the target only when a user 
adopts an analytic interpretation of it in terms of the target and (b) an analytic 
interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target underlies a set of rules to perform valid 
surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target. 
8. A Substantial Account of Scientific Representation 
I will now argue that a model represents a system if the user adopts an interpretation of 
the model in terms of the system. In other words, I will argue that interpretation is a 
sufficient condition for a model to represent a system (as opposed to represent it 
faithfully). If Suárez was right in thinking that it is not possible to formulate a substantial 
account of scientific representation, then interpretation could not be a sufficient 
condition for epistemic (and scientific) representation.  
If interpretation was not sufficient for representation, then there would be cases in 
which a user adopts an interpretation of a model in terms of a system but, nevertheless, 
the model fails to represent the system. The best way to argue that interpretation is not 
sufficient for scientific representation is to produce an example in which this is the case. 
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Suppose that someone “retargets” the Rutherford model of the atom in terms of some 
arbitrary system, say, a hockey-puck sliding on the surface of a frozen pond. Suppose 
that, according to the new interpretation, the electron in the model denotes the puck and 
the nucleus denotes the surface of ice. According to the general interpretation, it would 
then be possible to infer from the model that, say, the puck is negatively charged and the 
ice is positively charged, that the puck orbits around the ice surface in circular orbits, etc. 
If the account of scientific representation I propose is correct, it would seem that, under 
these circumstances, the Rutherford model of the atom is an epistemic representation of 
the system in question and, a critic may claim, this is clearly not the case. 
This criticism, I think, is based on a conflation of the notions of epistemic 
representation and partially faithful epistemic representation. It is very likely that, under 
any standard interpretation, the Rutherford model of the atom only leads to false 
conclusions about the system in question, or, in any case, we can assume so here. But this 
is beside the point. Unlike faithful epistemic representation, epistemic representation 
only requires that it is possible to perform valid inferences from the vehicle to the target 
and not that these inferences are sound. Thus there are two possible ways to argue that, at 
least in this case, interpretation is not sufficient for scientific representation. The first is 
to deny that surrogative reasoning is sufficient for epistemic representation; the second is 
to deny that interpretation is sufficient for (possible) surrogative reasoning. Since I have 
already discussed the relation between interpretation and valid surrogative reasoning and 
since Suárez explicitly denies that surrogative reasoning is sufficient for scientific 
representation, I will focus on the first option here.  
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So, on what grounds can one deny that surrogative reasoning is sufficient for 
representation? A first possible suggestion is that it is insufficient because in the above 
case all the conclusions about the system from the model are false. If this was the case, 
then a model would be an epistemic representation of a system only if it was a partially 
faithful epistemic representation of the system. This condition, however, seems to be too 
strong, as it would rule out that completely unfaithful epistemic representations of a 
target can be epistemic representations of that target in the first place. For example, 
suppose that a scientist proposes a bona fide model of a certain system that, upon 
investigation, turns out to misrepresent every aspect of the system. Even if, gradually, we 
might discover that all the inferences that are valid according to its standard 
interpretation are unsound, that model still seems to be an epistemic representation of 
the system, though an entirely unfaithful one. At no point in time we cease to regard the 
model as a representation of the system because of its being an unfaithful representation. 
The Thomson model of the atom is a good historical example of a model that it is very 
close to being such an entirely unfaithful representation of its target and, nevertheless, it 
is considered a representation of it. 
A second possible suggestion is that the Rutherford model is not an epistemic 
representation of the puck-on-ice system not because all the inferences from the model to 
the system are unsound but because the user knows them all to be unsound. If this was 
the case, then a vehicle would represent a target only if its user does not know all the 
inferences that are valid according to its standard interpretation to be unsound. If, in the 
above example, the user knew that all inferences from the model to the system are 
unsound, then the model would not be an epistemic representation of the system.  
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According to this suggestion, whether something an epistemic representation of 
something else is relative to the knowledge the user has of the system. However, in the 
above example, we have not mentioned anything about the knowledge the user has of the 
system and, as far as we know, the user could mistakenly believe that at least a few of the 
inferences that are valid according to the standard interpretation of the Rutherford model 
are sound. If this was the case, then for that user, the model would be an epistemic 
representation of the target, whereas, for us, it would not be one. Then, there would be 
nothing intrinsically wrong with claiming that, at least for some users, the Rutherford 
model could be an epistemic representation of the puck-on-ice system.  
Consider again the entirely unfaithful model example. When the model was originally 
proposed, we did not know that all of the inferences from the model were unsound. 
Thus, for us, the model was an epistemic representation of the system. However, with 
time, we gradually find out that all of the inferences from the model to the system were, 
in fact, unsound. However, there seems to be no reason to think that, when we found 
out that the even the last few inferences were unsound, we ceased to regard the model as 
a representation of the system. At most, we ceased to regard it as a partially faithful 
representation of the system and, as I have argued above, a representation does not need 
to be partially faithful in order to be a representation. 
A third possible suggestion is that the Rutherford model is not an epistemic 
representation of the puck-on-ice system because no actual user of the model can truly 
believe that the model allows any sound inference about the target system. This 
suggestion presupposes that a vehicle can be an epistemic representation of a target only if 
some user believes the vehicle to be a partially faithful representation of the target. The 
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difference between this suggestion and the first is that, according to this suggestion, the 
vehicle may turn out to be an entirely unfaithful representation of the target but still be 
an epistemic representation of it. The difference between this suggestion and the second 
is that, according to this suggestion, the vehicle can be known, at a later stage, to be an 
entirely unfaithful representation of the target but it might still be an epistemic 
representation of it. 
Consider again the entirely unfaithful model example. At some point we might have 
believed that some of the inferences from the model were sound, however this does not 
need to be the case. Sometimes a model of a system can be put forward as purely 
hypothetical and conjectural, without anyone believing that any of the conclusions about 
the system drawn from the model are going to turn out to be true. The model can be 
used as a generator of hypotheses about the system, hypotheses whose truth or falsity 
needs to be empirically investigated. This is often the case when we have little or no idea 
as to what the internal constitution of a certain system might be, as in the case of atoms 
in the mid-nineteenth century. Since there seems to be no reason to assume that 
surrogative reasoning is not sufficient for epistemic representation, I think we can 
conclude for the moment that it is (unless someone gives us some reason to believe it is 
not). 
So far, I have argued that there is no reason to think that surrogative reasoning is not 
sufficient for epistemic representation. If one were still to deny that surrogative reasoning 
is sufficient for epistemic representation, they would either have to assume that there is 
some “secret ingredient” that is present in the entirely unfaithful model case but is 
missing in the case of the Rutherford model of the atom and the puck-on-ice system. 
 28 
Unless some condition that is met in the first case and not in the second is specified, 
however, it is difficult to evaluate this claim. 
My intuition is that no such secret ingredient can be found. The difference between 
the two cases, I think, is circumstantial, not substantial. One does not need to have a 
profound knowledge of physics to realize that the Rutherford model cannot generate any 
interesting hypotheses about the puck-on-ice system, while the entirely unfaithful model, 
at the beginning of its career, can be a stimulating hypothesis as to the internal 
constitution of a certain system. The difference between the two models, however, is not 
that one represents the system while the other does not—they are both epistemic 
representations of their target systems. Nor is the difference that one does so faithfully 
while the other does not—they are both entirely unfaithful.  
The difference is only in the role the entirely unfaithful model plays in the wider 
picture. The exploration of the consequences of the entirely unfaithful model may guide 
a research program into the constitution of the system under investigation and may be 
instrumental to the development of better models of that system, while it is clear to us 
that the Rutherford model will not lead to the discovery of anything we do not already 
know about the puck-on-ice system and that it is a worse representation of that system 
than many other simpler and readily available models from classical mechanics.11 
                                                
11 One could probably claim that the Rutherford model of the atom is an uninteresting or unhelpful 
epistemic representation of the puck-on-ice system to anyone who already supposes that it is an entirely 
unfaithful representation of that system, but something does not fail to be a representation of a certain 
target because someone or even everyone finds it uninteresting. For example, a map of a railway network 
that it is no longer in use may be uninteresting to everyone now but it does not therefore cease to represent 
that network. 
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9. Reconsidering the Inferential Conception 
If the arguments in the previous section are correct, then there seems to be no reason to 
deny that (the possibility of) surrogative reasoning is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for epistemic representation. So, a substantial account of scientific representation seems 
possible. In fact, since surrogative reasoning is not only necessary but also sufficient for 
epistemic representation, then the inferential conception does provide us with necessary 
and sufficient conditions for epistemic representation. If Suárez were to insist that it is 
not a substantial conception, he should be able to deny that surrogative reasoning is 
sufficient for epistemic representation—i.e. he should produce cases in which a user can 
perform surrogative inferences from a vehicle to a target without the vehicle being an 
epistemic representation of the target. As I have argued, I do not think that there is room 
to do so without blurring the distinction between representation and faithful 
representation. 
If valid surrogative reasoning is already a necessary and sufficient condition for 
epistemic representation, however, one might legitimately ask why the inferential 
conception I have proposed here would be better than a substantial version of Suárez’s 
account, one according to which surrogative reasoning is both necessary and sufficient 
condition for epistemic representation.  
I think that the main reason to prefer interpretation to surrogative reasoning as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic representation is that interpretation is 
more fundamental than surrogative reasoning. It is in virtue of their interpretation the 
vehicle in terms of the target that users would be able to perform surrogative inferences 
from the vehicle to the target. While the possibility of surrogative reasoning always 
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accompanies epistemic representation, epistemic representation has conceptual 
precedence over actual surrogative reasoning. One performs inferences from the London 
Underground map to the London Underground network in virtue of the fact that the 
map represents the network. The reverse however is not true: the map does not represent 
the network in virtue of the fact that one uses it to perform inferences about the network. 
In fact, we would not even attempt to use a piece of glossy paper with coloured lines 
printed on it to find our way around London Underground network, if we did not 
already regard the former as an epistemic representation of the latter. Surrogative 
reasoning, thus, presupposes epistemic representation. Hence, if the map represents the 
network, it cannot do so in virtue of its allowing surrogative reasoning (on pain of 
circularity) but, it has to do so in virtue of something else. According to the account 
defended here, this something else is the fact that there is an interpretation of the map in 
terms of the network. 
The actual performance of surrogative inferences is just a “symptom” that allows us to 
tell apart cases of epistemic representation from cases of denotation. The actual 
performance of a surrogative inference from the model to the system reveals that the 
model is being used as an epistemic representation of the system. In this sense the 
relation between representation and surrogative reasoning is analogous to that between 
measles and Koplick spots. Whereas the spots appear if and only if one has measels, this 
does not mean that one has measles because they have Koplick spots.  
Suárez would probably agree with my claim that surrogative reasoning is only a 
symptom of scientific representation. In fact, I think that that is his most fundamental 
reason to think that his account is a deflationary one. The main difference between 
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Suárez’s account and mine is that, unlike Suárez, I believe that an account of epistemic 
representation can and should do more than listing the symptoms or surface features of 
scientific representation.  
According to the account I propose, a model represents a target and can be used to 
perform surrogative inferences about the target in virtue of the fact that the user interprets 
the vehicle in terms of the target. It is the user’s interpretation that turns an object into a 
representation of a certain target.  
10. Conclusion: In Search of An Account of Faithful Scientific Representation 
In this paper I have proposed and defended a substantial account of scientific 
representation according to which a model is a representation of a certain system in virtue 
of the fact that a user interprets the model in terms of the system. However, this is only 
the first step towards a full account of scientific representation. Although, in order to 
have an account of how models represent, it is necessary to have an account of epistemic 
representation; in and of itself, an account of epistemic representation does not constitute 
an account of how models represent. To see why, consider a case in which we use the 
ideal pendulum model to represent the tire swing in the garden. Once we have adopted a 
certain set of interpretive rules, we can infer, say, that the tension of the rope reaches its 
maximum when the swing is in its rest position. The problem is that, even if this 
surrogative inference is valid according to the set of rules that our interpretation of the 
model underlies, the inference may well not be sound. The fact that we have adopted an 
interpretation only implies that the model represents the system and not that it does so 
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faithfully. As I have maintained, the model represents the system faithfully only if the all 
the valid inferences are sound. 
But, if this is the case, in virtue of what does the model represents a certain system 
faithfully? In the pendulum example, we infer that the tension of the rope is highest 
when the swing is in its rest position from the fact that, in the model, the tension of the 
rope is highest when the pendulum is in its rest position. But why should what happens 
in the model tell us anything true about what happens in the system? In order to have an 
account of how models represent their target system, one’s account of representation has 
to be supplemented with an account of how scientific models faithfully represent their 
target systems. It is only when we’ll have also a solution to this second problem that we 
will have a full understanding of how models represent their target systems. 
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